Threat modeling is a structured way to identify how an application could be abused before or during implementation. It does not require a large workshop or a complex framework. A useful model connects important assets, entry points, trust boundaries and realistic attacker goals to concrete mitigations.
Identify assets and flows
List sensitive data, privileged actions, credentials, payment or account workflows and critical service availability. Draw the main data flows between browsers, application servers, databases, storage and external providers. Mark where data crosses a trust boundary.
Think from the attacker's perspective
Consider spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege. Ask what an unauthenticated user, ordinary account, compromised administrator or malicious integration could attempt. Include abuse cases such as bulk scraping and resource exhaustion, not only code injection.
Prioritize risks
Estimate impact and likelihood using a consistent team scale. Focus first on risks that expose sensitive data, enable privilege escalation or create irreversible actions. Record assumptions and unresolved questions so reviewers can revisit them as the system changes.
Turn findings into work
Each threat should have an owner, mitigation, verification method and status. Mitigations may include authorization checks, rate limits, audit logs, network restrictions, secure defaults or operational alerts. Verify controls with tests and deployment checks.
Checklist
- Identify assets, entry points and trust boundaries.
- Include abuse cases and privileged-user scenarios.
- Prioritize by impact and likelihood.
- Assign owners and verification steps.
- Revisit the model after major architecture changes.